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ABSTRACT
The Determinants of Financial Structure: Evidence
From Chinese Listed Hospitality Companies
by
Hong Jiang
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Hotel Administration
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Although financial structure is crucial to company’s sustainable development, rarely any
efforts have been made to investigate financial structure in a Chinese hospitality industry setting.
This thesis first explores financial structure o f Chinese hospitality firms by using panel-data
analysis.
All listed hospitality firms in China are included in the data sample. The study uses three
methods to measure financial structure. They are total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio
and short-term leverage ratio. Seven determinants, namely, firm size, growth, business risk,
profitability, asset structure, listing years and state ownership structure are used to explain
variations in leverage ratios. The result o f the regression analysis reveals that firms with great
profits and high risk level rely less on debts. Short-term and total leverage ratios decrease with
the variable o f firm size. Listing years impact firm ’s long-term leverage ratio negatively.
It is obvious that conventional financial structure theories based on developed economies are
applicable to Chinese hospitality companies, but their explanatory power is limited, given
Chinese hospitality firms distinctive features.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Study Background
China’s tourism industry is vigorously growing. In 2007, the domestic travelers reached 1.61
billion, spending 777.06 billion Chinese Yuan with an average expenditure per capita of 482.6
Chinese Yuan. The international tourist receipts ranked the seventh worldwide with a figure o f
25.74 billion US dollars in 2004. The figure jumped to 37.23 billion in 2007 with the
international tourist arrivals o f 45.08 million. In the recent five years, the inbound and domestic
tourism compound growth rate is 13.8% and 12.1% respectively, even higher than the growth
rate o f Chinese GDP (National Tourism Administration of the People’s Republic o f China
[CNTA], 2008).
Closely related with tourism industry, hospitality firms in China are developing by leaps and
bounds as well. Take lodging industry, a significant part of the hospitality industry, as an
example. From 2000 to 2006, the number o f star-rated hotels increased from 6029 to 12,751, an
increase of 111%. In 2006, revenues o f star-rated hotels are 148.29 billion Chinese Yuan, a
growth o f 10.1% compared with the last year (CNTA, 2007). WTO forecasts China’s tourism
industry will be the first in the world, accounting for 8.6% o f total world market share by the
year o f 2020 (Ball, Homer, & Nield, 2007).
Financing is an inevitable concern for all Chinese hospitality companies in order to maintain

tremendous and sustainable development. Financing decisions are among the most critical
decisions managers make (Keister, 2004). Financial structure choice is one important issue
among financing decisions. It is defined by the mix or proportion o f a firm ’s financing
represented by debt or equity (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001). As a matter o f fact, financial
stmcture decisions are even more critical to hospitality firms, given the industry specific features.
For example, lodging industry is very capital intensive. Compared with other industries, it
requires more funding for land, building, fixture and equipment, and fumiture (Kim, 1995).
Financial managers o f lodging companies must opt for a reasonable financial stmcture so as to
increase a firm ’s value and simultaneously decrease its cost o f capital (Van Home & Wachowicz,
2001). Restaurant industry is risk intensive (Upneja & Dalbor, 2001). A restaurant firm may not
be able to satisfy its obligation on excessive debt if its debt rate is too high. On the other hand,
financial managers o f restaurant firms are reluctant to pass by debt financing opportunities, since
debt is the cheapest source of extemal capital (Kim, 1995).
With the establishment of various financial stmcture theories, numerous empirical research
has been done to explore corporate financial stmcture. Most o f them try to identify determinants
of firm ’s financial stmcture (Huang & Song, 2006), because theories suggest that company
selects financial stmcture relying on attributes that determine various benefits and costs
associated with debt and equity financing (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Since all modem financial
stmcture theories are established on the basis o f US corporate financing strategies, most
empirical studies aim to test the explanatory power of those theories in the background o f
developed economies. Titman and Wessels (1988) studied financial stmcture o f 469 US
manufacturing firms for a sampling period from 1974 to 1982 using factor-analytic technique.

Raj an and Zingales (1995) did financial structure research based on G-7 countries. Hence, our
knowledge of corporate financing decisions has mostly been derived from developed economies,
such as US and other G-7 countries (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001).
Financial structure in underdeveloped economies has been left unexplored until recently.
Booth et al. (2001), after analyzing the financial structure o f companies from 10 developing
countries, demonstrated that conventional financial structure theories derived from developed
economies work in developing countries as well, and factors affecting corporate financial
structure are similar between developed and developing economies. Nonetheless, the influence
o f those factors is not consistent through all countries. For instance, the variable of business risk
positively influences leverage ratio in four countries, including Mexico, India, Jordan and
Thailand, while it has reverse impact on leverage ratio o f the other six countries in the sample
data. Given different country o f origin, determinants o f leverage ratio exert influence in different
manner. China is now in transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented
economy, so the impacts o f financial structure determinants in China could be distinctive as
well.
Although Liu (1999), Chen (2004), Chen and Strange (2005) and Huang and Song (2006)
have done some financial structure research studies in Chinese background, none o f them are
specifically designed for the Chinese hospitality industry. However, financial structure varies
greatly across different industry segments. Integrated oil companies, utility, chemical,
transportation, telecommunications, forest products and real estate corporations rely heavily on
debt financing (Myers, 2001). On the other hand, some high-tech firms, such as Merck and
Hewlett-Packard, as well as some service firms, such as Automatic Data Processing and

Netscape and some major pharmaceutical firms are heavy equity users (Brealey, Myers, &
Marcus, 1999). Titman and Wessels’ (1988) research studies confirm that companies in the same
industry sector are more likely to have similar financial structure, since their business risks,
profitability and asset structure are more comparable. Aggarwal (1981) underscores industry is
the most important determinant o f corporate financing. Liu’s (1999) research shows that industry
classification has effect on Chinese company’s financial structure. He reveals that the more
asset-intensive an industry, the more debts companies within the industry employ. Since the
hospitality industry has many characteristics that differentiate it from other economic sectors, it
is a must to analyze its financial structure individually.

Purpose o f the Study
Hardly any study has been found done on the subject o f financial structure o f Chinese
hospitality firms, even though a thorough research is long overdue. The purpose of the thesis is
to study the financial structure of Chinese hospitality companies by examining the determinants
that impact firms’ financial structure decisions.
The study should shed some useful lights on the financial structure o f Chinese hospitality
firms. Since investors tend to evaluate borrowing behavior o f other firms within the same
industry (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004), this study should also be of particular importance and
fascination for both domestic and international investors interested in investing in Chinese
hospitality industry, providing them with status quo o f financial structure in Chinese hospitality
firms.

Delimitation
The scope o f the paper is delimited by the following factors:
1. The study has only included public hospitality companies listed in mainland China as its
sample set. Those companies have main business operations in lodging, restaurant or tourism
sector. The time period covering by the study is from 2004 to 2006.
2. The study adopts three leverage ratios, namely, total, long-term and short-term debt ratios to
measure a hospitality company’s financial structure. Seven key determinants, which is asset
structure, profitability, business risk, firm size, growth, listing years and state ownership
structure that have been proposed or demonstrated to be useful in explaining corporate
financial structure variation by either theoretical or empirical studies, are tested in the
research.

Structure of the Study
The roadmap o f the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, various strands of financial structure
theories are revisited at first, including the seminal Modigliani and M iller’s (MM) theory
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958), the trade-off theory (Myers, 1977), the pecking order theory
(Myers & Majluf, 1984), and the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Then past empirical
research done in hospitality field and Chinese setting are reviewed. The dataset o f the study, the
outcome and predictor variables and the research methodology are discussed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 presents and discusses the findings of the empirical study. In Chapter 5, the
conclusion, study implication, limitation, and the suggestion for future study are put forward.

Definition o f Terms
1. Financial structure: details how a firm ’s assets are financed. It is a mix or proportion o f a
firm ’s short-term and long-term debts, preferred stock and common stock equity (Van Home &
Wachowicz, 2001). It should be noted that financial structure is different from the widely used
concept o f capital structure, which only includes permanent and long-term financing. Financial
structure is usually measured by total, long-term or short-term debt/leverage ratios.
2. CSRC code: industry classification established by China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC). All sample companies in this study are defined by CSRC code K as social service firms,
but fall into three different sub-sectors, which are hotel, restaurant and tourism.
3. Lodging firms: a group o f firms which are defined by CSRC code K/ hotel with primary
business operation area of providing lodging service for the general public.
4. Restaurant firms: a group o f firms which are defined by CSRC code K/ restaurant with
primary business operation area o f providing food and beverage for on-premise or take-away
consumption.
5. Tourism firms: a group o f firms which are defined by CSRC code K/tourism with primary
business operation area of inbound, domestic and outbound tourism, the development o f scenic
spots or theme parks, and the development, manufacturing and sales o f tourism souvenirs.
6. Liability: an economic obligation payable to an individual or an organization outside the
business. Short-term/current liability is due to be paid with cash, goods or services within one
year or within the entity’s operating cycle if the cycle is longer than one year. Long-term liability
is due to be paid with cash, goods or services over one year (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001).
7. Asset structure: shows mix of a firm’s asset type (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001). It is

usually measured by tangibility level, which is defined by the ratio o f tangible assets (fixed
assets plus inventory) to total assets.
8. Financial leverage: a firm’s use o f fixed cost sources of financing, such as debt and preferred
stock (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004).
9. Business risk: also known as operating risk. It refers to uncertainty inherent in a firm ’s
operations. Its impact is shown in the volatility of a firm ’s operating income (Brealey et al.,
1999).
10. Financial risk: is induced by the use of financial leverage. It refers to the added volatility in
stockholders’ earnings and the risk o f possible bankruptcy (Brealey et ah, 1999).
11. Financial distress: occurs when a firm is unable to meet its financial obligations to make the
required interest and principal payments. Financial distress costs arise from insolvency or
distorted business decisions before insolvency (Brealey et ah, 1999).
12. Agency problem: refers to a potential conflict of interests between the agent (manager) and
the principals (outside stockholders and creditors) (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
The most frequently mentioned financial structure theories are MM theory (Modigliani &
Miller, 1958), trade-olf theory (Myers, 1977), pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), and
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Even though none o f those established theories offer
a general explanation for corporate financing strategies in the real world (Myers, 2001), they are
all useful conditional theories which could at least help us understand a specific facet of
corporate financing (Barclay & Smith, 2006).
This chapter first covers the four well established financial structure theories are revisited at
first. Then, research studies regarding financial structure in hospitality companies are reviewed.
Albeit there are many empirical investigations o f financial structure, few o f them are done in a
Chinese setting. In the third part o f the chapter, studies in Chinese background are reviewed as
well.

Theoretical Studies o f Financial Structure
MM Theory
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) pioneered the studies of financial structure.
The underlying assumptions o f MM theory are perfect capital market and no taxation. Under
such circumstances, investors could borrow and lend by themselves on the same terms as firms.

so they would not pay extra for a levered firm which borrows on their behalf. MM theory
contends that a corporation’s financial structure does not affect its value and its capital cost.
Given that the total value o f a firm depends only on its profitability and risk, it stays the same if
those two factors do not alter (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001).
Trade-off Theory
The policy of financial stmcture does matter, for the real capital market, however, is far
from perfect. This explains why actual leverage ratio does not differ from firm to firm and from
industry to industry in a random way. Firms in dmgs, instmments, electronics and food
industries are low leverage users, while companies in paper, steel, airlines and cement are heavy
leverage users (Brealey, Myers, & Marcus, 1999). Tax benefits and financial distress costs affect
a firm ’s financing choices. Financial managers always try to strike a balance between the
benefits and costs o f debt financing. Trade-off theory suggests there is an optimal leverage ratio,
at which the present value o f tax shield on additional debt is just offset by the increase in the
present value of financial distress cost (Myers, 2001 ).
Unlike dividends, interests paid by corporation are tax-deductible. Tax shield, the term for
tax savings, can be calculated by interest expense multiplying tax rate. This is a major advantage
brought by debt financing. A levered company can distribute more to creditors and stock holders
compared with an un-levered one with same revenues (Van Home & Wachowicz, 2001). In
essence, the govemment subsidizes the levered firm for its use o f debt. However, personal
income tax somewhat lowers tax-shield benefits, but does not necessarily eliminate them
(Brigham & Gapenski, 1991), since equity holders are taxed at a lower tax rate on capital gains
and can defer tax payments until capital gains are realized (Barclay & Smith, 2006).

Despite the implication of the tax shield benefits that a firm should borrow to a hilt to
maximize its value, hardly any company adopts such financing policy, because an extremely
high debt ratio increases financial risks and financial distress costs as a result. Financial distress
costs have negative impact on a firm’s value. The costs o f financial distress consist o f insolvency
costs or costs o f distorted business decisions before insolvency. Legal and administrative costs
are directly associated with bankruptcy, including forced sale o f assets at below-market prices,
attorney fees, court fees and accounting costs (Brealey et al., 1999). In most cases, direct costs
only account for a very small proportion of the total pre-bankruptcy value of a firm (Brealey et
al., 1999). Although costs o f distorted business decisions before bankruptcy are hard to measure,
they are even more critical. Employees, customers and suppliers alter their actions when a firm
is on the brink of bankruptcy. Employees start job hopping; customers worry if the firm could
honor its warranties any longer and suppliers are not willing to deliver unless they could receive
cash (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004). Further, the management is also obliged to make decisions
which help ensure the survival of the eompany to the detriment o f its long-term growth. For
instance, firms slash R&D, training and maintenance expenses, because these costs do not
contribute to instant returns (Chatfield & Dalbor, 2004).
Pecking Order Theory
Those successful industry giants. Ford Motor Co., Procter & Gamble and Microsoft, all
operate at very low leverage level. As a matter o f fact, the most profitable companies in a given
industry are found to borrow the least (Myers, 2001). Pecking order theory suggests that a firm
has hierarchical preference for financial resources. A firm prefers to finance in the following
order: retained earnings and depreciation generated funds, debt financing and new common
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equity (Brealey et al., 1999).
Outside investors can hardly, if not impossible, access a firm ’s operational or financial
information as inside managers do. Issuing new debts releases the news that the management has
confidence in the firm ’s future profits and cash flows. On the other hand, issuing new equity
conveys the information that the company’s stocks have been overvalued, for the management
attempt to issue the overvalued security to maximize the benefits for existing shareholders
(Barclay & Smith, 2006). Consequently, increasing debt financing signal positive sign, whereas
issuing equity is regarded as a bad omen. On average, stock prices drop 3% after firms announce
new equity offerings (Barclay & Smith, 2006), while there is negligible impact on stock prices
when companies use debt financing (Myers, 2001). The drop in stock prices is regarded as
information costs (Barclay & Smith, 2006). Obviously, the information costs o f debt are less
than that o f equity.
The pecking order theory implies that financial managers would automatically choose the
cheapest available financing sources. The more profitable a company, the less the company
borrows, for it can draw on its internal equity for future development without incurring any
information or issuing costs (Barclay & Smith, 2006). Here is some evidence o f financing in US
enterprises endorsing the pecking order theory. In most years, extemal financing accounts for
less than 20% of investment funds, and most o f them are debts. In 1999, internal cash flow
financed $805 billion out o f $944 billion investment in US non-farm, non-financial firms.
Extemal financing covered the rest, which was $139 billion. However, the borrowing was $283
billion and the equity financing was negative $144 billion (Myers, 2001).
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Agency Theory
Agency problem emerges, because perfect alignment o f interests of managers, creditors and
shareholders are implausible in practice (Barclay & Smith, 2006).
Equity holders would vote for riskier operation or investment tactics and strategies,
especially when the company is in danger o f bankruptcy, since they are residual claimers. They
tend to gamble at the expense o f debt holders. Upside gains all accrue to stockholders, while
creditors would not be able to enjoy any extra gains, since they typically receive fixed interest
and principal. Since managers have the incentive to act in the only interest o f stockholders at the
expense of lenders, restrictive contractual agreements are imposed on the management by
creditors. Those agreements limit the management decision authority, resulting in suboptimal
investment and operation decisions. For instance, a firm may be forbidden to invest in particular
economic segments (Brealey et ah, 1999). The managers are monitored to ensure that they
comply with protective covenants in loan agreements. Monitoring could be done through
auditing financial statements and supervising by independent directors (Barclay & Smith, 2006).
Monitoring cost together with the cost o f suboptimal investment and operation decisions
constitute agency costs. When the debt level is low, the agency costs are immaterial. With the
growth o f the amount o f debts, agency costs become significant. Agency costs tend to rise at an
increasing rate with debt, and lower the corporation’s value as a result (Brealey et ah, 1999). The
presence of agency costs discourages a firm from borrowing, especially beyond a prudent level.
Agency theory also suggests the potential underinvestment problem (Barclay & Smith,
2006). A company with high leverage is more likely to pass up profitable investment
opportunities than a company with low level of debts. New equity holders understand that the
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value created or preserved by their investments would be used to restore creditors’ position.
Accordingly, incredibly high equity issuing eosts would oblige managers to give up profitable
investment plans. Even existing share holders would utilize their voting rights to let the
company forgo new investments, even if they are proved to be profitable. Because onee the
projects fall apart, the company would face the threat o f debt default or even bankruptcy
(Barclay & Smith, 2006).
On the other hand, the agency problem between managers and shareholders arises, when
managers o f firms with substantial free eash flow and limited growth opportunities squander
money on “empire building”, over-investing in core business, or even diversifying their
businesses by acquisition into unfamiliar ones (Narayanan & Nanda, 2004). All those actions
decrease a firm ’s value. Despite a variety o f methods to reduce excessive free cash flow, for
instance, paying higher dividends or stock repurchases, the most efficient way is to substitute
more debts for equity (Brigham & Houston, 2002). Therefore, in order to deerease the ageney
eosts between shareholders and managers, it is advisable to inerease firm ’s leverage ratio.
Interest payments are eontractual. If they are not realized, the company will default on debts or
go bankrupt. Given that, managers would be more disciplined.

Empirical Studies o f Financial Structure
Corporate Finaneial Structure Studies Within the Hospitality Industry
K im ’s (1995) study is a comprehensive panel data research done on the subject o f financial
structure in the hospitality industry. He based his study o f corporate financing decisions on the
data source o f 251 restaurant companies and 81 lodging firms in US from 1986 to 1992, whose
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financial information was available in the Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT PC Plus Database.
Three measures were used to represent financial structure, the dependent variable. They
were long-term, short-term and total debt to market value equity ratio. Attributes, such as firm
size, earning volatility, profitability, growth opportunity, non-debt tax shield, and asset structure,
were used to explain a firm ’s financial structure. The author employed several measurements for
each independent variables mentioned above. For instance, firm size was defined as natural log
o f sales revenue and natural log of total assets. Further, the author also combined some
industry-specific variables that had never been analyzed before into his multiple regression
models. The variable of franchising was included in the model for restaurant industry. It was
measured by the number o f franchised properties to total number o f properties. The dummy
variable o f management company was included in the model for lodging industry. It was coded
as “ 1” if it is a management company or franchisor and “0” if otherwise.
Ordinary least squares (OLS thereafter) regression was run. The results revealed that
conventional financial structure theories have strong explanatory power in US hospitality
industry. The variables o f asset structure, represented by the tangibility level, has strong positive
relation with total leverage ratio o f both hotel and restaurant industry. The variable of
profitability, on the other hand, has strong negative impact on the total debt ratio. The study also
demonstrated that a growing hospitality company relies less on debt financing. The variables of
franchising and management company do not seem to be significant factors influencing a
hospitality firm ’s leverage ratio.
Upneja and Dalbor (2001) addressed the financial structure o f US restaurant industry in
their paper. In their empirical model, total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term debt
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ratio were adopted to study the financial structure decisions o f all listed restaurants in US. The
authors determined the estimate o f Ohlson’s 0-seore (a measure o f the probability of
bankxuptey), operating eash flow, the number of years the restaurant firm listed in the
COMPUSTAT database, and the interaetion variable between operating eash flow and the
number of years the firm had been listed in the COMPUSTAT database as attributes whieh
would influenee a firm ’s finaneial strueture.
Contrary to the author’s expeetation, operating eash flow, the proxy for growth, has a
signifieantly positive effeet on total debt ratio. Besides, firm listing years are also signifieant and
positively related to total debt. However, the interaetion variable between those two faetors was
found to be signifieantly negatively related to the debt ratio, whieh eorroborates the previous
expeetation. The results o f the regression model for long-term debt are similar to those o f the
total debt ratio model, whereas the findings for the short-term model somewhat deviate.
Operating cash flow is significant and negatively related to the short-term debt. Neither the
listing years nor the interaetion variable is signifieant.
In another researeh paper, Dalbor and Upneja (2002) speeifieally designed pooled
regression model to investigate the relation between the amount o f long-term debt and its
determinants in a US restaurant firms setting. These determinants ineluded growth opportunity,
firm size, probability of bankxuptey and effective tax rate of the firm. All variables have strong
impaet on restaurant eompanies’ long-term borrowing with effeetive tax rate as an exeeption.
The authors argued that small firms are not able to pay substantial fixed eost o f long-term debts,
so they opt for short-term debts, therefore there exist a positive relation between firm size and
long-term debts. Moreover, firms with greater insolveney probability have limited aeeess to
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equity market, and they have to turn to long-term borrowing to finance their long-term growth.
Corporate Financial Structure Studies in a Chinese Setting
Liu ( 1999) used a data set o f all companies listed on two national stock exchanges, namely,
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, to study the corporate financial structure in China. Liu
collected data from financial statements during 1992 to 1997. The sample companies came from
five industries, which were manufacturing, trade, utility, real estate and conglomerates.
Liu (1999) adopted determinants of industry classification, firm size, profitability,
tangibility level and growth rate of assets to explain corporate financial structure in China. Most
factors were found to have similar impact on Chinese financial structure as they do in developed
economies. For example, size and tangibility level are positively related with debt ratio, whereas
profitability impacts debt ratio negatively. Yet, the empirical results revealed that the rate of
growth of assets is positively related to the debt ratio, which is contradictory to evidence in
developed economies.
The innovative point of Liu’s study is that he incorporated the variable of ownership
structure into the study. After analyzing extant financial structure theories and empirical
evidence as well as the Chinese business environment, the author proposed three hypotheses
regarding ownership structure; percentage of shares held by individual investors was supposed
to have no significant effect on leverage ratio; percentage of state shares was supposed to have
positive effect on leverage ratio and percentage o f legal person shares was supposed to have
negative effect on leverage ratio. Yet, the results o f OLS regression did not support the author’s
hypotheses. Though there is a consistent positive relation between percentage o f state shares and
debt ratio, and consistent negative relation between legal person shares and debt ratio, the results
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are not significant. This could be explained by that the author used long-term debt ratio to
measure financial structure, while long-term debt accounted for only about 6% o f total debt
according to the study.
Huang and Song (2006) used a new data base, the China Stock Market and Accounting
Research Database (CSMAR), to analyze the financial structure of 1200 publicly traded
companies in China. After running OLS regression, three ways o f robustness analysis, namely,
balanced, consolidated and first difference methods, were employed to check the stability o f the
relation between leverage ratios and the explanatory variables.
Except for some normally tested indicators, such as profitability, tangibility, tax, firm size,
non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and volatility, the research also encompassed
institutional shareholdings and managerial shareholdings as independent variables. Institutional
shareholdings were the proxy of the ownership structure and were defined as shares hold by
institutional investors to total outstanding shares. Managerial shareholdings were defined as the
number o f shares held by top management divided by the total number of outstanding shares.
The results o f the study shows profitability, growth rate and non-debt tax shields have strong
negative influence on the corporate financial structure, while firm size has positive impact. The
indicator of institutional shareholdings was found to have no significant effect on book or
market value total debt ratio. Managerial shareholdings, in contrast, are significantly negatively
related with total debt ratio. Their study also revealed that Chinese firms have lower leverage,
especially lower long-term leverage, compared with firms from G-7 countries.
Nonetheless, Chen and Strange (2005) argued the reason why ownership concentration was
not found a significant variable in financial structure model was that Huang and Song only took
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into consideration a limited range o f ownership structure.
Chen and Strange (2005) used a sample set of 972 corporations listed on either Shanghai or
Shenzhen Stock Market in 2003 to explore the determinants of financial structure in the Chinese
market. They classified institutional shareholders into three categories, namely, state agencies,
state-owned institutions and domestic institutions. According to the author’s definition, “state
agencies are government organizations exerting the functions of shareholders on behalf o f the
state; state-owned institutions are entities controlled by governments at various hierarchic levels,
and domestic institutions, are standalone entities set up by mixed groups o f shareholders” (Chen
& Strange, 2005, p. 12). The results showed the percentage o f shares hold by state agencies and
state-owned institutions have significantly negative impact on market value debt ratio, showing
that Chinese state shareholders attempt to avoid debt financing.
The authors also tested the independent variable o f listing years on the stock market. The
variable impacts leverage ratios in contradictory ways. It has significantly positive relation with
the book value debt ratio, but negative relation with market value debt ratio, yet not significant.
In contrast to the evidence in developed economies, business risks are positively related to both
book value and market value debt ratios. Given that China has its unique institutional features,
the result is not perplexing. Bankruptcy costs are low in China, especially for state-owned
enterprises (SOEs thereafter) for two reasons. First, the bankruptcy legislation is underdeveloped
with weak enforcement. Besides, currently, SOEs still remain to be the backbone o f the
economy employing a great number o f workforces. In order to maintain economic and social
stability, the government always comes to rescue once SOE is on the brink o f bankruptcy. Given
one salient feature o f the Chinese economy that 80% listed companies were used to be SOEs
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(Riedel, Jin, & Gao, 2007) and the state become the major shareholder after SOEs being
corporatised, bankruptcy should not be an issue for most listed firms. Consequently, those firms
are stimulated to resort to more debt financing, despite the high probability of bankruptcy.
The financial statements of Dow-China 88 Index covering a period from 1995 to 2000 was
employed by Chen (2004) to test the explanatory power o f western model of financial structure
in China. After eliminating firms from bank, insurance and investment industries, the final
sample contained 77 companies. The relationship between book value total and long-term debt
ratios with profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, tangibility, earnings volatility and
non-debt tax shields was tested. The author utilized three methods, which were pooled OLS,
fixed effects and random effects, to draw the conclusion.
The empirical evidence shows that leverage ratio decreases when profitability increases.
The author highlighted that the new pecking order theory explains the relation. Retained
earnings are Chinese firms first option o f financing source, equity financing the second and debt
financing is their last resort. Managers seek relative dependence on debt as opposed to equity for
two reasons. First, the capital gain in the stock secondary market is substantial with trading
prices usually 6 to 8 times higher than IPO prices (Chen, 2004). Besides, Chinese managers
have a mindset that capital funds from equity market are free money and can be squandered with
relative impunity (Roche, 2005), while debt financing is binding. Non-existence of shareholder
protection legislation and poor corporate governance, which are, unfortunately, not uncommon
in transitional economies, such as China, encourage the extensive use o f non-binding equity
financing.
Opposed to the common expectation that growth opportunities would have a negative effect
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on a firm’s debt ratio, the relationship is positive in China’s case. The author proposed two
explanations. First of all, the Chinese banks recognize the growth opportunity value. Bank loans
are more accessible to companies with great growth opportunities. Second, most listed firms are
in heavy industry sectors, which have more tangible assets and less growth chances. Tangibility
level has positive influence on leverage ratio. The relationship between size and debt ratio
remains ambiguous, for there is a positive relation between size and total debt ratio, but a
reverse relation between size and long-term debt ratio. The study suggested that Chinese firms
employ more short-term debts than long-term ones. As a matter o f fact, the study showed the
average long-term book debt ratio is only 7% in China.
Table 1 summarizes the findings of financial structure empirical research covered in the
literature review.
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Table 1
Summary o f Findings o f Previous Empirical Research Studies
Indicators

Kim

UD

Size
Profitability

+!-***

Business risk

+/-

DU

Liu

HS

CS

Chen

+***

+*

+**/-

+***/.

+/.***

_**

_***

_***

_***

+/-

+***

+/-*

+ ***

-

+ ***

Asset structure
+ ***

+**

(Tangibility)
+*

Listing years
Growth

_***

+***/-

+*/.*

+
+

State ownership

_***

_!_**

+ ***

+/.***

Note. The studies are from Kim (1995), Upneja and Dalbor (2001) which is denoted as UD,

Dalbor and Upneja (2002) which is denoted as DU, Liu (1999), Chen and Strange (2005) which
is denoted as CS, Huang and Song (2006) which is denoted as HS, and Chen (2003). Empty cell
indicates that the specific study did not include the certain indicator. “+” means that leverage
increases with the variable, and “-“means that leverage decreases with the variable.
* p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
The purpose o f the research is to explore the corporate financial structure of Chinese listed
hospitality firms by studying determinants o f financial leverage ratios. The research studies all
hospitality companies listed on Chinese stock markets using ordinary least squares (OLS
thereafter) regression analysis, the most widely used technique by previous relevant research
studies (Kim, 1995; Liu, 1999; Upneja & Dalbor, 2001).
Three regression models are built for total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio and
short-term leverage ratio separately. Seven determinants are employed to explain the variation in
leverage ratios. They are asset structure, business risk, profitability, growth, firm size, listing
years and state ownership structure. Since the last variable of state ownership structure have
been seldom used as independent variables in financial structure studies, except for Liu ( 1999)
and Chen and Strange’s (2005) studies, this study extend the range o f determinants suggested by
previous theoretical and empirical research. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) highlight since
different groups o f shareholders have various financial goals and priorities, contextual variables
such as ownership structure should be included into any analysis of financial structure.

Data Sources
In the paper, all hospitality companies listed in mainland China’s stock markets are
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employed as the dataset. Currently, there are 24 hospitality companies publicly traded in China.
Among them, 14 are listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and 10 on Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE). In the sample set, five companies are in lodging industry, two companies
operate restaurant business and the remaining seventeen companies are within tourism industry.
This is a quite small dataset compared with it in developed economies, such as US. According to
Kim (1995), there were 251 restaurant companies and 81 hotel companies listed on US stock
markets in 1992.
Two types o f shares circulate in mainland China. A-shares are traded by Chinese Yuan and
sold mainly to Chinese domestic investors. B-shares are traded by US dollars or HK dollars and
can be purchased by both domestic and foreign investors. In the sample set, four firms own both
A and B shares, and one firm only issues B shares.
Companies’ consolidated annual reports from 2004 to 2006 are the main data source for the
study, which are available in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SHSE) official website. Unconsolidated reports are not adopted because companies tend to
include subsidiaries’ equity in the reports, but not their liabilities, thus leading to statistical bias.
Further, consolidated financial reports eliminate the impact of intra-company transactions, which
inflate revenues and profits of parent companies (Madan, 2007). Since Li Jiang YuLong Tourism
Co., Ltd was listed in 2004, so its 2004 consolidated annual report is not available. KunMing
Horti-Expo Garden Co., Ltd was listed in 2006, so its consolidated annual reports are not
available for year 2004 and 2005. China QuanJuDe (Group) Co., Ltd and Jinling Hotel
Corporation, Ltd were listed in 2007, so their consolidated annual reports are not available for
year 2004 and 2005.
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Table 2 lists all sample companies’ trading locations, names, share codes and industry
classification.

Table 2
A List o f Sample Hospitality Corporations
No.

Name o f the company

Share code
(A/B shares)

Industry
classification

Shenzhen Stock Exchange
1

Shenzhen Century Plaza

000033

CSRC code K/hotel

000069

CSRC code K/tourism

000428

CSRC code K/hotel

000430

CSRC code K/tourism

000524

CSRC code K/hotel

000610

CSRC code K/tourism

000613/200613

CSRC code K/tourism

Hotel Co., Ltd
2

Shenzhen Overseas
Chinese Town Holding
Co., Ltd

3

Hunan Huatian Great Hotel
Co., Ltd

4

Zhang Jia Jie Tourism
Development Co., Ltd

5

Guangzhou Dongfang
Hotel Co., Ltd

6

X i’an Tourism Co., Ltd

7

Hainan Dadonghai Tourism
Center (Holdings) Co., Ltd
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Table 2
No.

(continued)
Share code

Name o f the company

(A/B shares)

Industry
classification

Shenzhen Stock Exchange
8

X i’an Catering Co., Ltd

000721

CSRC code K/restaurant

9

Beijing Jingxi Tourism

000802

CSRC code K/tourism

Development Co., Ltd
10

Emei Shan Tourism Co., Ltd

000888

CSRC code K/tourism

11

Guilin Tourism Co., Ltd

000978

CSRC code K/tourism

12

LiJiang YuLong Tourism

002033

CSRC code K/tourism

002059

CSRC code K/tourism

002186

CSRC code K/restaurant

Co., Ltd
13

KunMing Horti-Expo
Garden Co., Ltd

14

China QuanJuDe (Group)
Co., Ltd

Shanghai Stock Exchange
15

Huangshan Toursim

600054/900942

CSRC code K/tourism

600138

CSRC code K/tourism

600258

CSRC code K/tourism

Development Co., Ltd
16

China CYTS Tours Holding
Co., Ltd

17

Beijing Capital Tourism Co.,
Ltd
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Table 2 (continued)
No.

Share code

Name o f the company

(A/B shares)

Industry
classification

Shanghai Stock Exchange
18

China United Travel Co., Ltd

600358

CSRC code K/tourism

19

Dalian Sunaisa Tourism

600593

CSRC code K/tourism

600650/900914

CSRC code K/tourism

600749

CSRC code K/tourism

Holdings Co., Ltd
20

Shanghai Jin Jiang
International Industrial
Investment Co., Ltd

21

Tibet Shengdi Co., Ltd

22

Shanghai Jin Jiang

600754/900934

CSRC code K/hotel

601007

CSRC code K/hotel

/900929

CSRC code K/tourism

International Hotels
Development Co., Ltd
23

Jinling Hotel Corporation,
Ltd.

24

Shanghai Jinjiang
International Travel Co., Ltd

Note. Information derived from Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) or Shanghai Stock Exchange

(SHSE) official websites.
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OLS Regression Analysis and Variables

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the most widely adopted technique in studying
corporate financial structure. Following Kim (1995), Liu (1999) and Upneja and D albor’s (2001)
research, this paper uses OLS analysis to study the financial structure of Chinese listed
hospitality firms. The multiple regression model is built as follows:
y =

P\^\ + Pl^l

+ Pl^l + ^

+

Where:
Y stands for total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio or short-term leverage ratio, and
,Y j,

, A j , A g, A , represents asset structure, profitability, business risk, firm size,

growth, listing years and state ownership structure respectively. Both predictor variables and
outcome variables are discussed in further detail later.
= constant or regression coefficient of independent variables

(i= 0 ,1 ,2 , 3 ,4 , 5 ,6 ,7 )
^ = error term
Every dependent and independent variable is calculated for three years from 2004 to 2006.
Each year’s value is counted as one observation for the regression analysis. Given that
consolidated annual reports are not available for each firm every year, the total observations of
each variable for analysis is 65.
Dependent Variables
In this paper, financial structure is measured by book value total leverage ratio, long-term
leverage ratio and short-term leverage ratio. Total leverage ratio is defined as book value total
liabilities divided by book value total liabilities plus book value o f equity. Long-term and
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short-term leverage ratios are obtained when book value total liabilities are replaced by book

value long-term liabilities and book value short-term liabilities.
Albeit there is no consensus on whether book or market value is more appropriate
measurement for financial structure, given the high volatility o f Chinese stock market and the
high proportion o f state-owned untradeable shares, it has been argued that book value should be
a better method (Tong & Green, 2005). Further, financial managers design financial structure
based more on company’s book value (Chen & Strange, 2005). Also, using liabilities to measure
financial structure has its own strengths. First o f all, companies check liabilities rather than debts
only when they intend to increase leverage financing. In addition, accounts payable should be
included when measuring leverage ratio, since they are quite often used by many Chinese firms
as a means o f financing (Huang & Song, 2006). In the study, short-term leverage ratio is adopted
as a measurement for financial structure as well, because Chinese firms tend to use more
short-term debt financing than long-term one (Liu, 1999; Chen, 2004).
Proposed Independent Variables and Hvnotheses
The independent variables o f asset structure, profitability, business risk, firm size, growth,
listing years and state ownership structure are included in this study. All those predictor
variables are proposed or proved to have strong impacts on corporate financial structure by
previous theoretical or empirical financial structure studies.
A sset Structure (TANG)

According to financial structure theories, types of assets influence a firm’s financial
structure in some way (Titman & Wessels, 1988). The trade-off theory suggests firm with fixed
assets to use more debt financing, because it has the option o f issuing secured debts to decrease
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the probability o f financial distress. Firms with tangible assets that can serve as collateral are

supposed to have preferred access to debt financing, because collateral reduces creditors’ risks,
especially in the event of bankruptcy. Once facing the circumstance o f bankruptcy, companies
with higher proportion o f intangible assets are more vulnerable to value losses. On the opposite,
tangible assets can tide over the process o f bankruptcy largely unscathed. Procter & Gamble,
whose profits are mostly generated by intangible assets, always operate at low debt ratio
(Brealey et al., 1999). Issuing debts secured by assets with known value by outside investors
eliminate costs associated with information asymmetry (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004; Supanvanij,
2006; Titman & Wessels, 1988). It is suggested that a firm with higher tangibility level should
take this advantage to issue more debts. Further, managers are likely to be more discreet about
allotting capital when debts are collateralized (Kim, 1995), thereby largely lowering the agency
costs between managers and stakeholders. This could be another incentive to increase leverage
ratio.
Tong and Green (2005) analyzed corporate financial structure o f China’s top 50 public
corporations using firm-level panel data for the period o f 2001 to 2003. They found a firm with
more fixed assets tends to borrow more. Supanvanij (2006) employed the data sample o f 292
Asian firms from Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan and
Philippines. They reported a highly positive correlation between tangibility level and book value
long-term and short-term leverage ratios. Also, Chen (2004) found a positive relation between
long-term debt and firm ’s tangibility level.
Firm’s tangibility level, in this study, acts as the proxy of its asset structure. The study
defines asset tangibility level as the ratio o f tangible assets (fixed assets plus inventory) to total

29

assets, following Supanvanij’s (2006) approach.

Hypothesis 1: Tangibility level is hypothesized to be positively related to the leverage ratio
o f listed Chinese hospitality firms.
Profitability (PROF)

Pecking order theory (Brealey et al., 1999) highlights that a firm only resorts to external
financing when its internal funds are exhausted or not adequate. It indicates that profitability
negatively impacts debt ratio. Internal financing is the most economic and easiest source of
capital, for issuing debts and equity involves substantial issuance costs and information costs.
Besides, in China, the firm must meet strict criteria formulated by China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC thereafter), the institution in charge o f the stock market in China, before
seeking new stock issuance. According to CSRC, the firm could only apply for new equity
issuance, if its annual return on net assets is higher than 10% for the recent three accounting
period.
Macas Nunes and Serrasqueiro’s (2007) and Raj an and Zingales’ (1995) studies strongly
endorse the theoretical assumption. Krishnan and Moyer (1997) explored the financial structure
o f firms from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Korea and reported the same result.
This study applies Raj an and Zingales’ (1995) and Liu’s (1999) approach using operating
income to total assets as the measurement for profitability.
Hypothesis 2: The relation between profitability and leverage ratio is hypothesized to be
negative for publicly traded hospitality firms in China.
Business Risk (Risk)

The trade-off theory implies a firm with relatively high business risks is not supposed to rely
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heavily on debt financing, for the company has higher probability of bankruptcy and may not be
able to generate adequate revenues to cover its fixed contractual interest costs due to volatility in
earnings. Creditors opt for avoiding firms with high business risk, or they would demand high
compensation for undertaking extra risk, thus increasing companies borrowing costs.
Empirical studies by Friend and Lang (1988) and Walsh and Ryan (1997) reveal that
business risks and debt ratio are inversely correlated. Delcoure’s (2007) research focused on
financial structure o f transitional economies. The author studied firms from Poland, Russia,
Czech Republic and Slovakia Republic, and revealed in Russia, business risk is negatively
related with firm ’s debt ratios, yet the result is not significant. Huang and Song (2006) spotted
the negative relation between business risk and market value total debt ratio as well.
In Chen’s (2004) study, business risk is defined by absolute value o f percentage change in
operating income each year. This research follows Chen’s (2004) approach.
Hypothesis 3; Business risk is hypothesized to be negatively related to the leverage ratio for
listed Chinese hospitality firms.
Firm Size (SIZE)

Firm size is consistently found to be correlated with a firm’s debt ratio (Titman & Wessels,
1988). Large firms are more diversified in terms o f products and services and less likely to go
default or bankruptcy (Supanvanij, 2006). Not surprisingly, firm size is always regarded as the
inverse proxy o f bankruptcy probability. Consequently, large firms are expected to rely more on
debt financing as expected by the trade-off theory. Usually, large firms request more funds, so
they would have bargaining power over banks to arrange a lower interest rate (Eriotis, Vasiliou,
& Ventoura-Neokosmidi, 2007). Besides, large firms could enjoy economies o f scale in terms of
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debt issuance cost.

Macacs Nunes and Serrasqueiro’s (2007) research report a significant positive relationship
between firm ’s size and total leverage ratio. Tong and Green (2005) found the same result in the
research o f listed Chinese firms.
Following Krishnan and Moyer (1999) and Chen and Strange (2005), the study uses the
natural logarithm o f total assets as the indicator for firm size. This measurement could reduce
outlier effect brought by extremely large or small corporations (Kim, 1995).
Hypothesis 4: Firm size is hypothesized to be positively related with leverage ratio in the
Chinese hospitality setting.
Growth (GROW)

As suggested by the agency theory, managers are prone to expropriate wealth from debt
holders. The agency costs are even higher for a growing company for it has more diverse
investment opportunities (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004), therefore creditors would require strict
contractual agreement to limit the firm ’s investment behavior. A growing firm, however, would
borrow less so as to enjoy more flexibility in terms of investment (Supanvanij, 2006). In
addition, growth opportunities are intangible assets that can not be collateralized, and they do
not generate instant returns (Titman & Wessels, 1988). The fact may reinforce the hypothesis
that there is a negative relation between growth and leverage ratio.
Long and Malitz (1985) regarded advertising and R&D spending as the proxy o f growth,
and revealed that it has a strong negative influence on a firm ’s borrowing. Eriotis, Vasiliou and
Ventoura-Neokosmidi (2007) investigated financial structure by using panel data derived from
financial statements o f 129 companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. The authors used
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annual change in earnings to proxy growth and found it has strong negative impact on total
leverage ratio. The authors argued high growth implies high variation in earnings and in turn
high risks. Creditors would require high returns for bearing extra risks, which make debt capital
more expensive. Supanvanij (2006) affirmed that a growing company would borrow less.
This study uses the growth o f total assets to measure firm’s growth. Following Titman and
Wessels (1988) and Liu (1999), the growth o f total assts is defined by the percentage change in
total assets each year.
Hypothesis 5: The relation between growth and leverage ratio is hypothesized to be negative
for Chinese listed hospitality firms.
Listing Years (AGE)

The age o f publicly traded companies measured by their listing years is supposed to be an
important factor influencing corporate financial structure choices. The longer the firm listed, the
more investors know about the company and the less the information asymmetry costs. If the
company has a history o f making prudent investment, it would have preferred access to debt
resources with lower required rate of return.
Diamond ( 1989) brought to light that older firms issue more debts than their younger
counterparts. In Upneja and Dalbor’s (2001) study, they reported debt financing is more
accessible for firms with long listing years. Chen and Strange (2005) confirmed the conclusion
is also valid in China.
The study employs listing years on stock market as the indicator o f firm ’s age as in Chen
and Strange (2005).
Hypothesis 6: Firm ’s listing years are hypothesized to be positively related to the leverage
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ratio for listed Chinese hospitality firms.
State Ownership Structure (STATE)

China’s financial system is a system dominated by the banking sector and a banking sector
dominated by the government (Riedel, Jin, & Gao, 2007). The big four state-owned commercial
banks. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank o f China, Agriculture Bank
o f China and Bank o f China, account for 70% o f total bank lending (Roche, 2005). The
government intervenes in their lending practices heavily and it is the ultimate creditor indeed.
Berger and Udell (1994) suggests that a close relationship with creditors could substitute for
physical collateral involved in lending practices, because creditors could closely monitor the
firm, and thereby reduce information asymmetry. A high percentage o f state-owned shares
indicates a close relationship between the firm and the government. So, the firm would have the
impetus to borrow more with fewer costs. Company hold more state shares has high leverage
ratio as found by Liu’s ( 1999) research, although the finding is not statistically significant.
The proportion o f state-owned shares to total company shares is the indicator of state
ownership structure in the study. Two types o f shares constitute state-owned shares. One is state
shares hold by state agencies, who manage state-owned assets on behalf o f the government. For
example, state-owned asset supervision and administration commission or its provincial
branches. The other is state legal person shares, which are cross hold by other state-owned
enterprises.
Hypothesis 7: The relation between the percentage o f state-owned shares o f Chinese
publicly traded hospitality firm and its leverage ratio is hypothesized to be positive.
Table 3 gives seven independent variables, their measurements and expected signs.
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Table 3
Independent Variables’ Measurements and Expected Signs
Independent variable

Measurement

Asset structure (TANG)

Tangible assets

Expected sign

+
(Fixed assets + inventory)/ total assets
Profitability (PROF)

Operating income/ total assets

Business risk (RISK)

Absolute value o f annual percentage

-

change in operating income
Firm size (SIZE)

Natural log o f total assets

Growth rate (GROW)

Annual percentage change in total

+

assets
Listing years (AGE)
State ownership structure
(STATE)

Company’s listing years in stock market

+

State-owned shares
(state shares + state legal person

+

shares)/total shares
Note. “+” means that leverage increases with the variable, and “-“means that leverage decreases

with the variable.
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CH A PTER4

DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter reports and analyzes the empirical evidence based on the sample o f all listed
hospitality firms. In the first section, the descriptive statistics o f dependent and independent
variables are described. The second section examines the results o f Pearson correlation analysis.
In the last section, the findings o f ordinary least squares (OLS thereafter) regression analysis are
presented and discussed.

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for outcome variables (total leverage ratio, long-term leverage ratio
and short-term leverage ratio) and predictor variables (asset structure, profitability, business risk,
firm size, growth, listing years and state ownership structure) are shown in the Table 4. In the
table, TD denotes total leverage ratio, LTD denotes long-term leverage ratio and STD denotes
short-term leverage ratio. TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK
denotes business risk, SIZE denote firm ’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing
years, and STATE denote state ownership structure.
The average value o f total debt ratio (TD) o f hospitality firms is 44.5%, much lower than
the average total debt ratio of all Chinese listed companies, which is 53.07% (Chen & Strange,
2005). Yet, the figure is close to that of transitional economies, which is 46% (Delcoure, 2007).
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The total debt ratio o f hospitality industry is comparable to that o f other industries in China.
According to Liu (1999), the percentage of total debt ratio o f manufacturing, trade and
conglomerate industry are 44.06%, 43.38% and 45.17% respectively.

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Model
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

Std. Deviation

TD

.097

1.464

.445

.406

.264

LTD

.000

.233

.081

.000

.072

STD

.121

1.460

.373

.300

.254

TANG

.204

.906

.536

.511

.158

PROF

-.274

.190

.042

.042

.079

RISK

.003

52.410

3.266

.052

8.847

SIZE

18.764

22.682

20.604

20.510

.820

-.751

.654

.081

.707

.029

AGE

.000

13.50

8.188

9.00

4.054

STATE

.000

.885

.416

.401

.209

GROW

The mean short-term debt ratio (STD) o f listing hospitality companies is 37.3%, while the
mean of long-term debt ratio (LTD) is 8.10%. It is evident that long-term debt accounts for a
trivial proportion of all liabilities. The finding is similar to that o f Liu (1999) in non-hospitality
industries in China. This figure o f long-term borrowing lags far behind not only that of G-7
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countries, which is 41%, but also that o f developing countries, which is 22% (Chen, 2003).
According to Delcoure (2007), the average long-term leverage ratio o f four typical transitional
economies o f Russia, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic is 25.11%, 21.19%, 18.06% and
16.01% respectively. Kim (1995) used long-term debt to market value equity ratio to measure
US hospitality corporations’ long-term leverage. According to his study, the mean o f long-term
leverage ratio for US restaurant firms is 1.09, and the mean o f long-term leverage ratio for
lodging firms is 1.597.
Chinese hospitality firms have extremely low long-term debt ratio, because equity financing
is the main channel for long-term financing. The Chinese banking system is dominated by the
state government. The state-owned commercial banks contribute most o f loans (Riedel et al.,
2007). Not surprisingly, those loans are lent to state-owned or controlled firms. However, many
state-owned enterprises (SOEs thereafter) are often not able to re-pay bank loans because of
their low profitability. In 2004, the amount o f non-performing loans (NPLs) was about S300
billion or 15% o f total outstanding loans according to conservative estimate (Riedel, Jin, & Gao,
2007). The government is therefore inspiring banks to be more discreet about their lending
practices so as to lower the bad loan ratio. As a result, banks are reluctant to lend long-term
loans to corporations, for those loans are harder to monitor than short-term ones. On the other
hand, corporate bond market hardly exists in China. The value o f corporate bonds merely
accounts for less than 1% o f the country’s GDP, whereas it is 25% o f US GDP (as cited in Riedel
et al., 2007). The issuance o f corporate bonds is confined only to SOEs. The issuance process is
complicated and the standard is strict. In addition, the interest rate o f the bonds is regulated
administratively (Riedel et al., 2007). Given all those restrictions, Chinese corporate bond
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market could hardly be the choice o f long-term financing. In the first three quarters o f 2004, the
issuance amount of corporate bond is 18.5 billion Chinese Yuan, lagging far behind the amount
o f 1145 billion o f the stock. Equity market serves as the major long-term borrower in China
(Riedel et al., 2007).
The mean o f profitability (PROF) is only 4.2%, indicating Chinese hospitality companies
still have a long way to go to improve their earning ability. Take companies within the hotel
sector for instance. The recent two decades saw aggressive entry of almost all world renowned
multinational hotel giants into the Chinese market. Among them, InterContinental Hotel Group,
Starwood Hotels and Resorts and Accor Hotels are the largest in terms o f property number in
China (Ball, Homer, & Nield, 2007). Those internationally managed hotels outperform
domestically managed ones in many industry benchmarks. In 2006, within the five-star category,
the average daily rate (ADR) and the revenue per available room (RevPAR) o f internationally
managed hotels are 940 and 629 Chinese Yuan respectively, compared with 563 and 377 Chinese
Yuan of domestically managed five-star hotels (China Tourist Hotel Association, 2007).
The growth rate (GROW) o f Chinese hospitality enterprises differs. Since the growth rate o f
some firms is negative, it is obvious that though the tourism industry in China is burgeoning,
some companies have not seized the precious opportunity to develop themselves. Besides,
business risk (RISK), measured by annual percentage change in operating income, varies greatly
from one company to another with the standard deviation of 8.847. The tangibility level (TANG)
o f Chinese hospitality firms is relatively high with the mean o f 53.6%. The listing years (AGE)
of most hospitality companies are relatively short, with the mean o f slightly over 8 years. Issuing
equity is a brand new topic to hospitality firms in China, and this explains why the sample set in
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the paper is quite small. The mean proportion of state-owned shares to total company shares
(STATE) is 41.6%, indicating government is still a significant owner o f hospitality companies
listed in China.

Pearson Correlation Analysis
Table 5 presents the findings o f the Pearson correlation analysis. In the table, TANG denotes
asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk, SIZE denote firm size,
GROW denote growth, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE denote state ownership structure.

Table 5
Findings o f the Pearson Correlation Matrix
TANG

PROF

RISK

SIZE

GROW

AGE

TANG

1

PROF

-.435**

1

RISK

.086

-.331**

1

SIZE

-.029

.365**

-.140

1

GROW

-.081

.281*

.033

-.304**

1

AGE

-.032

-.181

.143

.127

-.035

1

STATE

-.150

.531**

-.210

.515**

.091

-.221*

STATE

1

Note. * p < .05, ** p <.01, one-tailed.

It can be deduced from the correlation matrix that a hospitality firm with higher level of
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fixed assets and inventoiy has lower profitability. Evidence from the table suggests that the
lower the business risk, the more profitable is the firm. It also suggests that profitability and the
proportion of state-owned shares are positively correlated in hospitality field. This result is
contradictory to previous research which reveals that state ownership has a negative impact on a
firm ’s overall profitability (Liu, 1999). It is obvious that government’s support plays an
important role in Chinese hospitality companies’ performance. The correlation coefficient also
points out that a large hospitality firm seems to be more profitable and have more state-owned
shares.

Findings From OLS Regression Models
OLS regression analysis for three models of book value total leverage ratio, long-term
leverage ratio and short-term leverage ratio are run separately in the study. Tables 6, table 7 and
table 8 present the findings o f OLS regression analysis. Since the observed significance level for
the F-value is 0.001, 0.001 and 0.009 respectively, it is concluded that the overall utility o f the
three regression models in explaining the variation in leverage ratios is strong. The R-square for
the three models are 35.6%, 28.7%, and 29.6%, meaning around 35.6% to 28.7% variation in
leverage ratios are explained by the three models. The signs o f the regression coefficients are
stable between the three models, except for the variable o f asset structure, firm size and state
ownership structure.
Often, when two or more independent variables are included in OLS regression model, they
would contribute overlapping information (McClave, Benson, & Sincich, 2005), and could in
turn lead to the pitfall o f multicollinearity. Once multicollinearity exists, the results o f OLS
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regression analysis might be misleading. Variance inflation factor (VIF thereafter) is the
benchmark to test the severity o f multicollinearity (MeClave et al., 2005). Since all VIF values
are far below 10 with the highest number of 1.988, multicollinearity should not be considered as
a problem in this study.
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Table 6
R esults o f OLS A nalysis O ver Total Leverage Ratio

Model

1

Unstandardized

Standardized

coefficients

coefficients

Variable

T-stat

VIE

Beta

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

:L895

.901

TANG

.118

.211

.069

.557

1.260

PROF

-1.497

J5 3

-.431

-2.706***

2.089

RISK

-.008

.004

-.246

-2.066**

1.170

SIZE

-.118

.047

-.365

-2.527**

1.716

GROW

^5 3

.157

.196

1.615

1.212

AGE

-.006

.012

-.054

-.478

1.064

STATE

489

.205

.066

.434

1.927

R-square

.356

Adjusted

.271

3.212***

R-square
F-stat

4.194***

Note. Model 1 reveals the relationship between total leverage ratio and independent variables.

TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk, SIZE
denote firm ’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE denote
state ownership structure.
*p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
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Table 7
R esults o f OLS Analysis O ver Long-term Leverage Ratio

Model

2

Unstandardized

Standardized

coefficients

coefficients

Variable

T-stat

VIF

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

.042

.251

TANG

.039

.059

.087

.672

1.260

PROF

-498

.154

-.434

-2.589**

2.089

RISK

.000

.001

.002

.018

1.170

SIZE

.005

.013

.062

.406

1.716

GROW

039

.044

.116

.907

1412

AGE

-.007

.003

-462

-2.188**

1.064

STATE

-.024

.057

-.069

-.428

1.927

R-square

487

Beta
.169

Adjusted
.193
R-square
F-stat

3.053***

Note. Model 2 reveals the relationship between long-term leverage ratio and independent

variables. TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk,
SIZE denote firm ’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE
denote state ownership structure.
*p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
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Table 8
R esults o f OLS A nalysis O ver Short-term Leverage Ratio

Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

coefficients

coefficients

Variable
B

Std. Error

T-stat

VIF

Beta
2.844***

(Constant)

Z578

TANG

-.030

.906

-.018

-.140

1.260

PROF

-1.336

.212

-.400

-2.402**

2.089

RISK

-.007

456

-429

-1.834*

1.170

SIZE

-.103

.004

-.333

-2.206**

1.716

GROW

408

.047

.168

1.324

1.212

AGE

-.001

.158

-.007

-.057

1.064

STATE

.027

.012

.021

.131

1.927

R-square

496

Adjusted

.203

R-square
F-stat

3.182***

Note. Model 3 reveals the relationship between short-term leverage ratio and independent

variables. TANG denotes asset structure, PROF denotes profitability, RISK denotes business risk,
SIZE denote firm ’s size, GROW denote growth rate, AGE denotes listing years, and STATE
denote state ownership structure.
*p< .10. **p<05. ***p<.01.
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Profitability (PROF)
The predictor variable o f profitability is consistently negatively correlated with total,
long-term and short-term leverage ratios at the significance level o f 0.01, 0.05 and 0.05. The
result confirms the hypothesis as well as findings o f other financial structure studies done before.
In developed economies, Friend and Lang (1988) reported similar result exists in US firms.
Wiwattanakantang (1999) pointed out that there is a negative relation between profitability and
leverage ratio in Thai companies. After studying all Chinese listed companies in the year o f 2003,
Chen and Strange (2005) drew the conclusion that profitability impacts book value total leverage
ratio negatively.
The result seems to strongly support the classical pecking order theory. However, the theory
should not be accepted without reservation. It is evident that there is a revised pecking order
theory in practice in China (Liu, 1999; Chen, 2004). Firm prefer retained earnings to equity
financing, and turn to debt financing as last resort. The situation is mainly due to the fact that in
China, the enforcement of shareholder protection is weak, so equity is regarded as free funds by
managers (Chen, 2004).
Firm Size (SIZE)
The variable o f size has significantly negative influence on both total and short-term
leverage ratios at the significance level o f 0.05. Yet, it has a positive relation with long-term debt
ratio, though not statistically significant. The outcome implies that large hospitality firms have
higher long-term leverage ratio, whereas small ones have higher short-term leverage ratio.
Marsh (1982) found the same evidence in a UK setting as well. This could be explained by the
relatively high transaction costs facing by small hospitality firms when issuing long-term
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financial instruments (Titman & Wessels, 1988). Moreover, high fixed costs o f long-term debts
are more affordable to large firms (Tang & Jang, 2007).
Although opposed to the proposed hypothesis, the result o f negative relationship is not
surprising, for it is consistent with some empirical research done in the background o f both
developed and developing economies. Timan and Wessels (1988) found small US manufacturing
firms tend to borrow more short-term debts. Chen and Strange (2005) also found a negative
relationship between firm size and book value total debt ratio in China, yet not significant.
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) and Raj an and Zingales (1995), large corporations
disclose more information to outside investors, and consequently, they have better access to
equity market, since the information costs associated with equity financing is low. This is
impetus for large firms to issue equity rather than debts.
Listing Years (AGE)
The variable o f listing years influences long-term leverage ratio in a negative way with the
significance level of 0.05. It also impacts both total and short-term leverage ratio negatively, yet
not statistically significant. This result is opposed to the hypothesis. It reveals the fact that the
older the listing, the less likely that a hospitality company would borrow debts, for it could rely
on equity financing instead. The longer the listing, the more the investors know about the
company. Therefore, the firm is able to collect equity with low information cost. According to
Chen (2004) and Liu (1999), in China, there is a new pecking order in terms o f financing in
which equity financing is more attractive than debt financing. The shareholder protection
legislation is impotent, so the funds collected through equity financing are regarded as free funds
by managers.
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Berger and Udell (1998) brought to light that debt ratio decreases as the company become
more mature, since there is no need for them to turn to debt financing, because they could rely
on adequate internal funds or equity financing for reinvestment and further growth. It could be
argued that the hospitality companies included in this study are already in the mature stage of the
growth cycle, since they have already been listed.
Business Risk (RISK)
Business risk has negative influence on Chinese hospitality companies’ total and short-term
financial leverage ratios at the significance level o f 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. However, it has
no explanatory power for long-term leverage ratio, since the regression coefficient is
insignificant. The negative relation supports the hypothesis. Huang and Song (2006) also spotted
the same result between business volatility and a firm ’s market value debt ratio. It supports that
the trade-off theory works in the Chinese setting, since the concern that financial distress costs
occur due to the failure to make contractual interests and principal payments would hold
managers back from borrowing more debts.
Asset Structure (TANG)
The effect o f the determinant o f asset structure seems to be ambiguous. Tangibility level has
a positive impact on total and long-term debt ratios, but negative impact on short-term debt ratio.
Both impacts are not significant. Companies with high tangibility level borrow more long-term
debts than short-term ones.
The result, to some extent, supports the previous expectation. On one hand, a Chinese
hospitality company is more likely to be debt-financed if it comes up with more assets in place
to serve as collaterals. Chen (2004) found tangibility level has significantly positive correlation
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with leverage ratio, when studying the Chinese listed eompanies. Williamson (1988) also
reported the same results. On the other hand, since it is even harder to monitor a company with
fewer fixed assets, the company is supposed to borrow more to reduce agency costs between
managers and shareholders (Kim, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Growth (GROW!
Growing hospitality companies need more capital and they rely more on both short-term
and long-term debt financing in China, though the relation is insignificant.
Chen (2004) also found out a positive relation between growth opportunities and debt ratio
in Chinese context. The author argues that it is the case because both banks and investors
recognize the value of growth opportunities. Growth opportunities in hospitality field are usually
tangible, such as property renovation or new property establishment, while common growth
opportunities in other industries are often intangible, such as R&D (Dalbor & Upneja, 2004).
Besides, Titman and Wessels (1988) cited evidence from Myers that growth might be found to
be positively correlated with short-term debt, because the use of more short-term debt would
mitigate the agency problem. The finding o f this study endorses his assumption.
State ownership Structure (STATE)
The influence o f state ownership is uncertain according to the findings o f the study.

It has

negative influence on long-term leverage ratio, yet reverse effect on short-term and total debt
ratios, although none of the relation is statistically significant.
Although the negative sign deviates from the hypothesis, it conforms to Chen and Strange’s
(2005) result. State, as the significant shareholder of most listed hospitality corporations in
China, would like to escape debt financing to avoid financial distress costs. Zeckhauser and
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Pound (1990) found a negative relationship between the presence o f large shareholders and firm
leverage as well. Besides, since in China, state-owned enterprises’ managers and board members
are appointed and monitored closely by the government, there is no need to depend on debt
financing to mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders.
On the other hand, the positive sign corroborates Berger and Udell’s (1994) assumption that
a close relationship with creditors substitute for collateral when borrowing. However, the close
relationship leads to less borrowing expenses only when company borrows short-term debts.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion
This research is a preliminary effort in attempting to analyze the determinants o f financial
structure o f Chinese hospitality firms. After studying the relationship between three leverage
ratios and seven important indicators suggested by theoretical or empirical studies, the major
findings are presented as follows.
The most significant variable for the three leverage ratios is profitability. The predictor has
strong negative impacts on firm ’s total, long-term and short-term leverage ratio with the
significance level o f 0.01, 0.05 and 0.05 respectively. Hospitality firm facing great business
risk borrows much less than others. The regression coefficient o f the indicator o f firm size is
negative and is significant at the level o f 0.05 for both total and short-term leverage models.
Also, a hospitality firm with long listing years is less likely to borrow long-term debts. Overall,
the signs o f regression coefficients are consistent among three models of total leverage,
long-term leverage and short-term leverage, except for the variable o f asset structure, firm size
and state ownership structure. A Chinese hospitality firm with more assets in place tends to
borrow more long-term debts than short-term ones. Firm size positively correlates with total
and short-term debt ratios, but inversely relates to long-term debt ratio. Hospitality firm hold
higher state-owned shares opt to have more short-term borrowing than long-term debt
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financing.
Conventional financial structure theories established on the basis o f developed economies
are applicable to Chinese hospitality companies, but their explanatory power is limited to some
extent. This critical finding validates the results o f relevant research studies done either in
developing or transitional economies (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001;
Delcoure, 2007). Evidence reveals that the determinant of business risk fails to explain
long-term debt financing decisions, and leverage ratios increase slightly with the factor of
growth, contradictory to the hypothesis. Table 9 presents the comparison between the
hypotheses made in the third chapter and the actual results obtained from Chinese hospitality
companies.
On one hand, it brings to light that listed Chinese hospitality firms are operating as
market-oriented firms in developed economies. Despite still in strong grip o f the government,
they are profit-maximizing enterprises. On the other hand, it also highlights that Chinese
hospitality companies hold distinctive features that are deviate from the underpinnings of
conventional financial structure theories. First o f all, since conventional financial structure
theories are developed to explain long-term debt financing behavior, their explanatory power
suffer greatly given that Chinese hospitality firms’ long-term borrowing ratio is extremely low,
with the average o f only 8.1%. Moreover, financial structure theories are constructed on the
basis o f financial structure evidence o f a wide variety o f industries. Obviously, they do not take
into consideration any industry specific factor. In most industries, growth opportunities are
generally intangible assets, but in hospitality field, growth opportunities, such as property
renovations, are tangible assets (Dalbor & Upneja, 2004). It explains the positive effect of
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growth on debt borrowing.

Table 9
Comparison Between Hypotheses and Actual Results
Expected regression

Actual regression

coefficients sign

coefficients sign

Asset structure

+

+/-

Profitability

-

Business risk

-

_**

Firm size

+

+/.**

Growth rate

-

+

Listing years

+

_**

State ownership structure

+

+/-

Determinant

Note. “+” means that leverage increases with the determinant,

with the determinant, and

means that leverage decreases

means that both positive and negative relation between leverage

and the determinant are identified by the study.
*p<.05. **p<.01.

Study Implication
This research is the very first financial structure study concerning Chinese hospitality
companies. It contributes to the extant body o f knowledge about Chinese corporate financial
structure by examining the determinants o f financial structure in a Chinese hospitality setting.
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The findings o f the study affirm that determinants proposed or proved to be useful in explaining
corporate financial structure of developed countries impact Chinese hospitality companies as
well.
Chinese hospitality companies’ average debt borrowing is low, especially in terms o f
long-term debt financing. A profitable hospitality company is supposed to borrow less,
especially when it faces great business risks. The variable o f size impacts firm ’s total and
short-term leverage ratio in a negative way. Besides, the research also reveals that the older the
listing, the less long-term debts a hospitality company relies on, since it could turn to
self-financing or equity financing as a better option. Investors could draw on the findings o f the
study before designing their own financial structure.

Limitation
It has been suggested that prospective domestic and international hospitality investors may
draw on the findings of the paper to get an insight into the typical financial structure of Chinese
hospitality firms. Nonetheless, it should be noted that since there is an inevitable bias resulting
from sample selection, the results o f the study must be interpreted with great caution.
First o f all, all listed companies have undertaken recapitalization according to the
standards formulated by China Securities Regulatory Commission before obtaining IPO
permission (Liu, 1999). Hence, their financial structure may converge to some extent. Besides,
most listed companies in China are large or medium-sized ones with higher profitability level.
They are not representatives of all hospitality companies in China. The findings o f the study may
not necessarily apply to small or privately owned hospitality firms which may have special
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restrictions on their financial structure, such as restrictive loan covenants (Andrew, Damitio, &
Schmidgall, 2007). In China, firms in private sector have very limited access to debt financing
through state-owned commercial banks or corporate bonds (Neftci & Menager-Xu, 2007). It
must be taken into consideration that private and public sector in China differ greatly in terms o f
financing ability and capacity.

Recommendation for Further Study
Although the R-square and adjusted R-square o f the study are comparable with other similar
studies o f Chen & Strange (2005), Supanvanij (2006) and Huang and Song (2006), they are still
not very satisfying. It suggests that some variation in debt financing still remains unexplained. In
the future study, researchers are recommended to employ alternative methods to measure
financial structure determinants. Some industry specific variables, such as average daily rate
(ADR), occupancy rate or revenue per available room (RevPar) are believed to better reflect
growth o f a hospitality company than those more general measurement like sales growth (Tang
& Jang, 2007). The study methodology could also be extended to investigate financial structure
o f individual lodging or restaurant properties.
The number o f publicly traded restaurant and lodging firms is too small for a meaningful
regression analysis. Currently, there are only two restaurant companies and five hotel companies
traded on Chinese stock market. When the available data sample is large enough, it is advisable
to separate companies according to their sub-sectors when doing financial structure analysis,
because different industry sub-sector has its own unique features which have impact on financial
structure decisions. For example, lodging industry is known by its fixed asset intensiveness and
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seasonality.
Finally, it is ideal if the data of market value o f debts are available. Titman and Wessels
(1988), Kim (1995) and Supanvanij (2006) all suggest that using market value o f debts is a more
accurate way than book value to measure firm’s leverage ratio.
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